Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 10
Issue 2 Winter 2010: Climate Law Reporter
2010

Article 5

Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate
Governance
David B. Hunter
American University Washington College of Law, dhunter@wcl.american.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hunter, David. “Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate Governance.” Sustainable
Development Law & Policy, Spring 2010, 4-15, 56-57.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for
Global Climate Governance
by David Hunter*

R

Introduction

arely has as much anticipation accompanied an international meeting than swirled around the 15th Conference
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), also known as the
Copenhagen Summit in honor of the city where it was held in
December, 2009. The announcements in early November that
President Barack Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao would attend
the conference turned an important climate negotiation into an
enormous summit featuring most of the world’s leaders. Along
with these leaders, upwards of 40,000 participants from civil
society, the private sector, and governments sought to shoehorn
their way into the conference center.
Rarely, too, has so much fanfare accompanied so little substance. Although many in the United States heralded the outcome as a diplomatic success that freed the climate issue from
the chains of an unworkable UN process, by almost any measure
the Copenhagen summit has to be viewed as a disappointment.
Rather than a detailed, binding framework for furthering global
climate cooperation, the parties left Copenhagen with a general
political statement that privileges the voluntary actions of states
and devalues the role of international law and global climate
governance.
The result was not a negotiation over targets or actions, but a
series of unilateral press releases, with each country announcing
what it is willing to do to mitigate climate change. The potential give-and-take that, in theory at least, is one of the hallmarks
of international negotiations was relevant only to the modalities
of climate finance, adaptation, technology transfer, reporting,
and verification. Even with these issues, precious little compromise or leadership was apparent, and little was ultimately
accomplished.
There is plenty of blame to go around. Rather than marking the United States’ triumphant return to international climate negotiations with strong leadership in unifying the world
around shared bold action, the Obama Administration offered
only modest targets and never moved from them throughout the
two weeks. Nor did any other major emitting country strengthen
its mitigation actions during the negotiations. Instead of participating in a discussion over what mitigation targets industrialized countries should take, the United States drew its line in
the sand around the extent to which large developing countries
would allow their mitigation actions to be monitored, reviewed
or verified (“MRV’d”). While maintaining a central focus on
this issue, the United States essentially refused to budge on most
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other issues (with the arguable exception of financing, which is
discussed below).
Ultimately, the Copenhagen Accord seems as much a capitulation as a compromise. The Accord reflects the United States’
preferred “pledge and review” approach; each country that associates with the Accord is expected to make some commitment
to mitigate climate change. This was not a negotiating victory
except in the sense that the United States was not forced to take
on any legally binding obligations in the absence of similar
developing country commitments. Although developing countries had to drop their desire for a Kyoto-like agreement that
would hold only industrialized countries to binding targets, the
net result was that no one would be subject to binding targets.
The United States, China, and India could all claim success, but
the environment was the clear loser. India and China did agree to
more reporting requirements but virtually no international monitoring or verification of their commitments. Also lost was any
schedule for negotiating a binding legal agreement.
Only twelve paragraphs long, the Copenhagen Accord
could nonetheless mark a substantial realignment of global climate governance. To be sure, the long-term ramifications of the
Copenhagen Accord are not yet certain, but some initial, tentative conclusions can be reached about the direction that the
Copenhagen Accord seems to lead us in global climate governance. After describing what exactly the Copenhagen Accord
does and does not do, this article will lay out some initial implications for international climate law and governance.

The Road to Copenhagen
The Copenhagen negotiations were formally convened as
the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) to the UNFCCC1
and the Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol.2 The UNFCCC, signed in 1992, sets forth the broad
framework for international climate governance, including the
overall objective, principles, and institutional structure for international cooperation with respect to climate change.3 The United
States, as well as almost every other country of the world, is
a party to the UNFCCC, which is widely understood to set no
binding targets or timetables for reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997, on the other
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hand provides for clear targets and timetables for industrialized
countries that are parties. President Clinton signed the Protocol,
but it was subsequently repudiated by President Bush in 2001.
The Protocol entered into force without U.S. participation in
2005.4 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union and other
industrialized countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions an average of five percent below 1990 levels.5 These reductions are to be achieved during the years 20082012, known as the first reporting period.6 The Protocol also
established an elaborate “cap-and-trade” system to reduce the
costs of compliance through the creation of a market for GHG
emission reductions—the so-called carbon market.

The Bali Work Plan
Recognizing that the first
reporting period under the Kyoto
Protocol would end in 2012, the
global community worked for
several years to set forth a negotiating plan that would build on
the Kyoto Protocol, bring the
United States back into the UN
process for addressing climate
change, and outline the future
obligations, if any, of developing countries. These efforts
culminated in 2007 when the
parties to the Framework Convention agreed to the so-called
Bali Road Map—a roadmap to
Copenhagen.7 The Bali Road
Map is comprised of several forward-looking decisions, including (1) a timetable with a 2009
deadline for negotiating further
commitments of those parties
that have adopted an emissions
cap under the Kyoto Protocol
(called “Annex I Parties”),8 (2)
a decision operationalizing the
Adaptation Fund that had been
created under the Kyoto Protocol and was critical for developing country participation,9 (3) a
compromise on what to include in the review of the adequacy of
the Kyoto Protocol as required under Article 9,10 and (4) the Bali
Action Plan.11 The Bali Action Plan set out an ambitious framework for negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement with binding commitments on all parties. The parties, including the United States
and most other major countries in the world, agreed to launch
a “comprehensive process” for achieving a “shared vision for
long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal
for emission reductions.”12 That process was intended to culminate in an agreement at Copenhagen.
The Bali Action Plan further enumerated a number of topics for “consideration” during the negotiations, including: (i)

“measurable, reportable and verifiable” commitments, including
quantified emissions limitations, by all developed countries; and
(ii) nationally appropriate mitigation actions (“NAMAs”) by
developing country Parties, “supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.”13 Thus, in the Bali Action Plan,
all developed countries (including the United States) agreed to
negotiate commitments that would include further binding caps
on emissions. For their part, all developing countries (including China and India) agreed to negotiate NAMAs to reduce the
threat of climate change. The developing countries did not commit to negotiating caps on emissions, but did commit to negotiations over taking actions of some indeterminate nature. Other
provisions in the Bali Action Plan committed the parties to
negotiate positive incentives for
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(“REDD”) in developing countries,14 enhanced actions for
adaptation,15 technology development and transfer,16 and international financial support for
responding to climate change.17
The Bali Action Plan committed both the United States
and developing countries to
negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement with some form of binding—or at least measurable,
reportable, and verifiable—
commitments. Under the terms
of the Bali Action Plan, the
agreement was to be negotiated by the Fifteenth CoP of the
UNFCCC in December, 2009 in
Copenhagen. The Bali Action
Plan set forth the priorities for
the Copenhagen negotiators and
all of the elements are reflected
to some extent in the Copenhagen Accord.
The track from Bali to Copenhagen was a roller coaster ride of expectations. The inauguration
of the Obama Administration, for example, gave new hope that
an era of U.S. exceptionalism and isolation with respect to climate change had ended, yielding to greater U.S. willingness to
accept binding international targets for GHG reductions. Indeed,
the Obama Administration placed climate change on the top of
its domestic legislative agenda with the hopes that economywide emission targets passed by the U.S. Congress could form
the basis for international commitments at Copenhagen.18 Even
before his inauguration, Obama signaled to the international
community his intention to engage in meaningful climate negotiations by publicly endorsing federal cap-and-trade legislation
with targets for reducing current emissions to 1990 levels by

Rather than a detailed,
binding framework
for furthering global
climate cooperation, the
parties left Copenhagen
with a general political
statement that privileges
the voluntary actions
of states and devalues
the role of international
law and global climate
governance.
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2020, and eighty percent reductions from 1990 levels by 2050.19
In the end, the Obama Administration’s international position
would remain tethered—some would say held hostage—to the
prospects of climate legislation in the U.S. Congress.
As the prospects were turning positive in the United States,
other countries began to announce their positions with respect to
the Copenhagen negotiations. Europe agreed to reduce emissions
by 30% from 1990 levels if there was an agreement reached by
all major countries, but would otherwise reduce emissions only
20%. At the December 2008 negotiations in Poznan, developing countries, too, proposed a wide range of commitments that
were generally seen as signaling their willingness to take serious
mitigation steps. Among these 2008 proposals: China promised
to reduce its energy intensity by twenty percent by 2020; Brazil committed to cut its deforestation rate by seventy percent by
2017 (resulting in a thirty to forty-five percent reduction in the
country’s GHG emissions); Mexico pledged to cut its emissions
by fifty percent by 2050; South Africa committed to capping its
GHG emissions by 2025 and working toward a decline thereafter; and Kazakhstan announced a decision to join Annex I of the
Kyoto Protocol and reduce emissions to 1992 levels by 2012.20
These developing country pledges were premised on access
to expanded financing and technology from the industrialized
countries.
More problematic was the form of any international agreement. Most observers initially assumed that the Copenhagen
negotiations would result in an amended or revised Kyoto Protocol.  The United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol,
however, and consistently opposed any suggestion that it would
agree to anything that even looked like the Protocol. Many climate advocates nonetheless hoped for a new binding “Copenhagen Protocol” that imported most, but not all, parts of the Kyoto
Protocol, giving the United States some political cover while
maintaining the basic components of the Kyoto carbon market.  
This offered a relatively clean solution, but it would become
clear in Copenhagen that the Obama Administration, emphasizing a lack of support in the U.S. Senate, would not seriously consider such an option. Moreover, such an approach left open the
question of how to incorporate “measurable, reportable and verifiable” commitments from developing countries, which resisted
making such commitments in a legally binding instrument.
The leading alternative option to a binding Protocol was to
implement the Copenhagen agreements through a series of decisions by the Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) to the UNFCCC.  
This would not require ratification by any of the parties, but
the legal status of CoP decisions was open to question.  Such
decisions do not fit into the traditional sources of international
law and they may not be viewed as binding in many national
jurisdictions.  A U.S. appeals court, for example, has found that
CoP decisions made under the Montreal Protocol are not part
of domestic law and do not have to be implemented by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.21
One variation was Australia’s pledge-and-review proposal.  Patterned loosely after the way tariff schedules are created under the World Trade Organization, each country would
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be asked to make some kind of commitment based on factors
such as their economic status and their historical contribution to
climate change.  In this way, industrialized countries would be
expected to accept mandatory emissions caps, while developing countries might choose from a wide range of policy options,
including energy intensity targets, sectoral targets, or promises
to create certain policies.22 Unclear in these proposals was how
or whether the pledges would be mutually binding and how the
transfer of Northern financial and technological support would
be aligned with the diversity of Southern commitments.  Developing countries were unlikely to make any significant commitments without the binding promise of Northern financial
support, and the North was unlikely to make financial commitments without knowing what the pledges would be.
The long-awaited proposal by the United States released in
early May 2009 was deliberately ambiguous, referring vaguely
to an “implementing agreement” that would “allow for legallybinding approaches.”23  This language essentially left open the
form and binding nature of any Copenhagen agreement, to be
decided at a later time.  With only six months left until Copenhagen, wide divisions still remained over the basic form of the
negotiations—and time was running short.
President Obama’s Administration seemed to be working hard for an agreement, holding bilateral summits with both
China and India.24 The broad agenda for both summits placed
climate change cooperation high on the list. Subsequently, when
President Obama announced that he would attend the Copenhagen Summit (followed closely by similar announcements from
the leaders of both China and India), many observers believed
an agreement had already been reached among these key countries. Why else would these leaders risk their political capital
in showing up at Copenhagen? World leaders typically show
up for photo opportunities at international summits, not for
negotiations.
As Copenhagen approached, countries began to position
themselves more clearly for the upcoming negotiations—but
the public signals remained largely mixed. The United States
announced they would accept targets of 17% reductions from
2005 levels by 2050 and 80% reductions by 2050. 25 This
matched the reductions set forth in the proposed legislation
working its way through the U.S. Senate. Europe reaffirmed its
commitments to cut 30% from 1990 levels by 2020 if a universal
agreement could be reached.26 Most importantly, major developing countries, including eventually Brazil, China, and India
all agreed to at least some specific mitigation actions.
Despite these encouraging announcements, as Copenhagen
neared, no agreement among key countries had emerged over
the form and status of the agreement. In fact, hopes for a legally
binding agreement dimmed considerably when countries participating in the November, 2009 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting announced that Copenhagen should result in a
“political” deal only. As Copenhagen opened, many observers
believed that such a political agreement—with a firm deadline
for negotiating a future legally binding agreement—was the best
that could be hoped for.
6

At Copenhagen
The first week of the Copenhagen negotiations proved to be
contentious with little progress made even on the basic issue of
what form the agreement(s) should take. The nation of Tuvalu
demanded discussion on a single, legally binding agreement.
China and other developing countries adamantly opposed the
proposal, wanting to pursue the “two-track” approach: additional binding commitments for developed countries under the
Kyoto Protocol and nonbinding actions for developing countries pursuant to Decisions of the parties or by other means.
The United States opposed both Tuvalu and China’s positions
because both would require U.S. participation in an agreement
essentially patterned after the Kyoto Protocol. In the meantime,
a leak of a draft “Danish Agreement,” intended as the negotiating text for a non-binding, political agreement was met with
widespread acrimony, particularly from developing countries. A
new coalition of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (quickly
dubbed the “BASIC” countries) called for continuation of the
Kyoto Protocol with stronger commitments and a binding U.S.
mitigation target, coupled with financial and technical support
for voluntary developing country mitigation actions. With no
clear consensus on even the most basic structure of the agreement, negotiators appeared to be waiting for the Heads of State
to arrive in the second week.
The Heads of State arrived, but with few answers or solutions. After all of the speeches were completed, no agreement
was evident. It was clear the United States would be taking a
hard line and offering little compromise. President Obama’s
well-publicized intervention into the meeting of the BASIC
countries would ultimately lead to the agreement on the Copenhagen Accord, but his haste to control the public messaging for
a domestic audience by announcing the agreement in a press
conference meant that the Accord would be met with anger
and frustration from many negotiators. Although some agreement was arguably better than none, the Accord left many issues
unanswered.

The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen Accord is a non-binding political agreement. It is not a treaty nor did the parties intend in any way to
be legally bound to the commitments in the Accord. As a political declaration with widespread acceptance, it can rightly be
labeled a form of soft law—but that label adds little to the discussion of the impact of the Accord. Its impact will have less to
do with whether it is legally binding (it is not), and more to do
with whether it is politically accepted as a viable framework for
organizing international climate cooperation moving forward.27
If successful, the Accord could pave the way for more universal
commitments that in the future could form the shape of a more
legally binding set of commitments. This section looks more
closely at the terms of the Copenhagen Accord.

Shared Vision for Long-Term Cooperative Action
As part of the Bali Action Plan, the parties, including the
United States and most other major countries in the world,
7

agreed to launch a “comprehensive process” for achieving a
“shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a
long-term global goal for emission reductions.”28 Much of the
discussion up to and during Copenhagen anticipated reaching
a global consensus regarding clear timetables for when global
emissions and atmospheric concentrations of GHGs would peak.
Unfortunately, the Accord provides little specificity surrounding future global targets and failed to advance the discussion much beyond what had been achieved seventeen years
before in the UNFCCC. Under the UNFCCC, the objective of
international climate cooperation has been to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”29 That level has long been assumed to require holding the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius.
Given recent developments in climate science, however, small
island states and others were pushing for a consensus commitment to limit long-term changes to less than 1.5 degrees. In the
Copenhagen Accord, the countries agreed to “enhance [their]
long-term cooperative action to combat climate change,” “recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius.”30 They also agreed
that deep cuts in global emissions “are required according to science . . . with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold
the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius,
and take action to meet this objective consistent with science
and on the basis of equity.”31 In a compromise with those who
sought a stronger goal, the countries called for an assessment
of the Accord by 2015, which would include “consideration of
strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters
presented by the science, including in relation to temperature
rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.”32 In this way, the parties could be
seen as not turning their back completely on science-based calls
for stronger emission reductions.

The General Framework for Mitigation
Countries that decide to join the Copenhagen Accord are
required to commit themselves to a climate mitigation strategy
that they identify and report publicly to the international community. Countries are divided into two categories. First, Annex I
countries (i.e. industrialized countries that were listed on Annex
I of the UNFCCC) commit to implement “quantified economywide emissions targets for 2020.”33 These commitments are
expected to “further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol.”34 Second, non-Annex I countries
(i.e. developing countries) will submit “mitigation actions,”
which are not further defined except that they should be in the
context of sustainable development.35 Least developed countries
and small island developing states “may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.”36 In addition and critically,
developing countries agreed for the first time to provide national
reports of their greenhouse gas inventories every two years consistent with Article 12.1(b) of the UNFCCC.37 Biannual reporting was considered a major concession by developing countries.
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Both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries that choose
to associate with the Copenhagen Accord were supposed to
announce their commitments by January 31, 2010. Those commitments are reported to the UNFCCC secretariat and reported
on their website.38 As of March 2010, approximately 75 countries
have made commitments under the Copenhagen Accord, including 41 Annex I and 34 non-Annex I countries. As expected, the
commitments vary considerably, even within each category of
countries. Many of the Annex I commitments are conditioned
on a more ambitious agreement in the future, or in the case of
the United States, on passage of
national legislation. Developing countries also took varied
approaches. Some, for example
South Africa, identified significant cuts from current “business
as usual” estimates of emission
trajectories (thus allowing their
emissions to increase but less
than expected). Others, such as
India and China, committed to
reducing their energy intensity
(i.e. to improving their emissions per unit output) but placing no overall cap on emissions.
Still others, like the Congo or
Brazil, listed numerous sectorspecific actions or goals they
would meet. Some representative examples of country
pledges are listed below on page
9-10.
The pledges under the Copenhagen Accord have been
met with mixed response. On the one hand, some value must
be attached to getting so many countries to commit publicly to
addressing climate change—and many of these commitments
are specific and significant. Overall, however, the aggregation of
commitments does not appear to get the world close to the levels
necessary to limit temperature increases to the 2 degree Celsius
goal identified in the Accord. According to the World Resources
Institute:
Existing pledges by developed countries, when added
together, could represent a substantial effort for reducing Annex I emissions by 2020—a 12 to 19% reduction of emissions below 1990 levels depending on the
assumptions made about the details of the pledges. But
they still fall far short of the range of emission reductions—25 to 40%—that the [Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change] notes would be necessary for stabilizing concentrations of CO2[equivalent] at 450 [parts
per million], a level associated with a 26 to 78% risk of
overshooting a 2ºC goal.40
Of course, the Copenhagen Accord is designed at least to
some extent to allow for changing commitments to be added
over time.41 Nonetheless, current reduction commitments were

disappointing to most observers and prompted repeated protests
in Copenhagen from, among others, 350.org, which seeks commitments at a level that will reduce long-term atmospheric GHG
concentrations to 350 parts per million.42

Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
Ever since the Bali negotiations finished and the world’s
attention shifted to Copenhagen, requirements for monitoring,
reporting, and verification (“MRV”) loomed among the most
controversial and difficult issues. It was clear that developing
countries would agree to a wide range of voluntary commitments, but they were resistant
to any international oversight—
i.e. any MRV requirements—
attaching to those voluntary
commitments. On the other
hand, developing countries
wanted MRV requirements to
apply not only to industrialized
country mitigation commitments, but more controversially
to their commitments of financial and technology assistance.
Ensuring some MRV requirements applied to the developing country NAMAs was a high
priority for industrialized countries, particularly for any actions
that would be supported through
international financial or technology assistance.
In the end, developing
country mitigation actions were divided into two categories:
those receiving support from developed countries and those that
would be unsupported. Unsupported mitigation actions taken
by developing countries will be subject only to “domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will
be reported through their national communications every two
years.”43 Developing countries are also to provide “for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.”44 If
a developing country chooses to seek international financing to
support their mitigation action, they must subject their activity
“to international measurement, reporting and verification.”45 For
developed countries, commitments both to reduce emissions and
provide financing will be measured, reported, and verified.46 In
each of these cases, detailed guidelines for MRV must still be
determined in future negotiations under the Conference of the
Parties, a potentially difficult task.

The result was not a
negotiation over targets
or actions, but a series of
unilateral press releases,
with each country
announcing what it is
willing to do to mitigate
climate change.
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Forests and REDD-Plus
One area that enjoyed perhaps the greatest consensus in
Copenhagen was the framework for reducing emission from
deforestation and forest degradation (“REDD”). Developing
countries saw this as an opportunity to generate significant
amounts of foreign assistance and investment to improve the
8

Appendix I - Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020
Annex I Party

Quantified Economy-wide Emissions Targets for 2020

Base Year

Australia

-5% up to -15% or -25%. Australia will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% on
2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal capable of stabilizing levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower. Australia
will unconditionally reduce our emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 2020, and by up
to 15% by 2020 if there is a global agreement which falls short of securing atmospheric
stabilization at 450 ppm CO2-eq and under which major developing economies commit
to substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s.

2000

Canada

17%, to be aligned with the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in
enacted legislation.

2005

EU and its 27 Member
States (Currently, not
all EU Member States
are Annex I
Parties)

20%/30%. As part of a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012,
the EU reiterates its conditional offer to move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to
1990 levels, provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable
emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their
responsibilities and respective capabilities.

1990

Japan

25% reduction, which is premised on the establishment of a fair and effective international framework in which all major economies participate and on agreement by those
economies on ambitious targets.

1990

Kazakhstan

15%

1992

New Zealand

10%/20% New Zealand is prepared to take on a responsibility target for greenhouse gas
emissions reductions of between 10% and 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, if there is a
comprehensive global agreement. This means: the global agreement sets the world on
a pathway to limit temperature rise to not more than 2° C; developed countries make
comparable efforts to those of New Zealand; advanced and major emitting developing
countries take action fully commensurate with their respective capabilities; there is an
effective set of rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); and there is
full recourse to a broad and efficient international carbon market.

1990

Norway

30-40%. As part of a global and comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012
where major emitting Parties agree on emissions reductions in line with the 2° C target,
Norway will move to a level of 40% reduction for 2020.

1990

Russian Federation

15-25%

1990

United States of
America

In the range of 17%, in conformity with anticipated U.S. energy and climate legislation,
recognizing that the final target will be reported to the Secretariat in light of enacted legislation. (The pathway set forth in pending legislation would entail a 30% reduction in 2025
and a 42% reduction in 2030, in line with the goal to reduce emissions 83% by 2050.)

2005

9
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Appendix II - Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions of Developing Country Parties (selected Parties)39
Non-Annex I
Party
Brazil

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions

• Reduction in Amazon deforestation (range of estimated reduction: 564 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Reduction in “Cerrado” deforestation (range of estimated reduction: 104 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Restoration of grazing land (range of estimated reduction: 83 to 104 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Integrated crop-livestock system (range of estimated reduction: 18 to 22 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• No-till farming (range of estimated reduction: 16 to 20 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Biological N2 fixation (range of estimated reduction: 16 to 20 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Energy efficiency (range of estimated reduction: 12 to 15 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Increase the use of biofuels (range of estimated reduction: 48 to 60 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
• Increase in energy supply by hydroelectric power plants (range of estimated reduction: 79 to 99 million tons of
CO2eq in 2020);
• Alternative energy sources (range of estimated reduction: 26 to 33 million tons of CO2eq eq in 2020);
• Iron & steel (replace coal from deforestation with coal from planted forests) (range of estimated reduction: 8 to
10 million tons of CO2eq in 2020);
These actions are expected to lead to reductions of 36.1% to 38.9% from projected business-as-usual.

China

China will endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to the
2005 level; increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020; and
increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from
2005 levels.

Congo

Listed 33 specific actions, including training and education for forest conservation.

India

India will endeavor to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020 in comparison to the 2005
level.

Israel

Israel “will do its utmost” to reduce its CO2 emissions by 20% from a business-as-usual projection primarily by
calling for a 10% share of renewable energy generation and 20% reduction in electricity consumption.

Marshall
Islands

40% reduction of CO2 emissions below 2009 levels by 2020.

Mexico

Mexico aims at reducing its GHG emissions up to 30% from projected business-as-usual emissions by 2020, provided the provision of adequate financial and technological support from developed countries as part of a global
agreement.

South Africa

34% reduction in projected business-as-usual emissions by 2020. 42% reduction in projected emissions by 2025.
Implementation depends on financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building support from
developed countries.
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sustainable management of their forest resources and land-use
practices. Developed countries recognized avoided deforestation
as offering relatively inexpensive mitigation that could generate
cheap offsets for meeting their international reduction commitments. Ably chaired by Tony La Vina, the REDD negotiations
had progressed in Copenhagen to a relatively detailed proposal
being forwarded for approval by the parties, but the draft (like
many other draft decisions) was never formally adopted, and
was instead preempted by the Copenhagen Accord.47
The Copenhagen Accord endorsed REDD and called for
“the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDDplus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from
developed countries.”48 The parties also agreed to provide additional financial assistance in both the short- and long-term for
establishing REDD activities. Such a mechanism will likely be
established during the Mexico negotiations planned for November 2010, and the existing draft text will hopefully form the basis
for those REDD negotiations.

Financing and Technology
As in all environmental negotiations, the terms and extent
of financial support from developed countries was critical.49
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a high-profile announcement that the industrialized countries would collectively provide
$10 billion in annual support over the near term (2010-2012)
and financial resources up to $100 billion per year by 2020.50
These numbers would be enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord,
but several critical questions surrounding finance remain: (1)
what revenue sources will provide the promised financial support for addressing climate change; (2) what institutions would
be used to distribute it; and (3) for what purposes can the support
be used.
First, with respect to the sources of funding, the Copenhagen Accord contemplates that the additional financial resources
committed to climate change “will come from a wide variety
of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral.”51 Following Copenhagen, many donor countries have clarified their
specific financial commitments for the period 2010-2012, with
commitments as of March 2010 nearing $25 billion towards the
$30 billion goal.52 Less clear at this point is where the resources
will come from to meet the $100 billion per year commitment by
the period 2020. To this end, the Copenhagen Accord announced
a “High Level Panel” to be established under the Conference of
the Parties to study various potential sources of revenue to meet
this goal.53 The High Level Panel was subsequently created
under the auspices of the UNFCCC and is expected to provide
its recommendations by the time of the next meeting of the Conferences of the Party in November, 2010.54 The Panel may consider both public and private sources of climate financing; civil
society is hoping that the Panel will consider and recommend
innovative sources, including for example: taxes on international financial transfers (also known as a Tobin Tax); the use of
Special Drawing Rights under the International Monetary Fund;
a tax on bunker fuels from international aviation and maritime
shipping; and shifting money that currently funds fossil fuel
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subsidies towards climate mitigation. Each of these four potential revenue sources are generally of a magnitude that could contribute significantly to meeting the committed target, but each of
them also face political hurdles and additional challenges.
The institutional structure for delivering the promised climate finance is also yet to be determined. The United States
strongly supports using the World Bank and other existing institutions as the primary delivery vehicle for climate finance. The
United States argues that the Bank is an efficient and knowledgeable institution in delivering multilateral assistance, but perhaps
the more important reason for U.S. support is that the United
States enjoys dominant decision making power in the World
Bank (holding seventeen percent of the voting share). Not surprisingly, developing countries oppose the Bank and seek a new
funding mechanism with more representative decision making
structures.55
The Accord does not clearly decide what role the World
Bank or other existing institutions will play, but it did announce
that a new “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” (“CGCF”) will
be established as “an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention.”56 The Fund cannot be formally established until the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties.
The operational and governance modalities will also need to
be negotiated. The expectation is that the governance structure
of the CGCF will have equal representation of developed and
developing countries. At least this appears to be the implication
from the Accord’s reference to adaptation funding: “New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective
and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure
providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow
through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.”57
In addition to the High Level Panel and the CGCF, the
Accord announced one further new institution at least indirectly
related to financial support: a Technology Mechanism “to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action
on adaptation and mitigation.”58 The mission, operating guidelines, structure, and composition of the Mechanism have not yet
been clarified.
Finally, details will still have to be negotiated regarding
what activities will be eligible for international climate financial support. For the most part, the Copenhagen Accord was all
inclusive: the Parties agreed to provide “[s]caled up, new and
additional, predictable and adequate funding . . . to enable and
support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial
finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and
transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation
of the Convention.”59 The Accord also promises a “balanced
allocation between adaptation and mitigation,” with priorities
for adaptation funding to go to “the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island
developing States and Africa.”60 The CGCF’s mission as spelled
out in the Accord will be to “support projects, programmes,
policies and other activities in developing countries related to
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mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building,
technology development and transfer.”61 The net result is that
the Accord contemplates financial support for a wide range of
climate-related activities, but more detailed conditions on the
use of the funds must still be negotiated in the next few years.
Indeed, financing is now expected to be a major focus of the
2010 negotiations in Cancun, Mexico.

Implications for Global Climate Governance
It is undoubtedly too soon to understand fully what the
long-term implications of the Copenhagen Accord may be. The
Accord is only one step in what is a decades-long effort to fashion a comprehensive and effective global approach to climate
change. Although the Accord arguably signals a major shift
away from the global cap-and-trade approach of the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol, we may find in ten years that the Accord
simply shaped a process that still led to a system fundamentally
shaped by the Protocol’s cap-and-trade system. We must, therefore, recognize that the implications of the Accord will depend
as much on what happens in the next few years of negotiations
as what happened at Copenhagen. This is all the more true, given
the relative general nature of the Accord, the lack of clarity in
how the Accord relates to the UNFCCC, and the lack of a clear
consensus for a way forward. Indeed, the lack of consensus on
next steps was particularly striking at Copenhagen; the Summit
ended with no clear work plan for ensuing CoP negotiations or
for the Secretariat, resulting in an unprecedented lack of clarity
over the direction of future climate negotiations. Although some
of the uncertainty has been addressed in the months following
Copenhagen, the long-term direction of the post-Copenhagen
climate regime is still unclear. With these caveats firmly in mind,
this article ventures some potential implications of the Copenhagen negotiations for the future of global climate governance.

The Threat to a Negotiated, Science-Based
Approach
The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol embody a clear topdown global approach to addressing climate change, in which
(1) scientists through, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (“IPCC”) inform the negotiators of what cap
on global emissions is necessary to avoid the most significant
negative climate impacts; (2) the negotiators agree to a system
of targets and timetables that will achieve the science-based
cap on emissions; (3) a global market-based system will assist
in re-allocating the cap, through such mechanisms as cap-andtrade and the offset market; and (4) compliance with targets
and timetables will be monitored internationally and sanctions
for non-compliance may be imposed by the other parties. The
Copenhagen Accord essentially has rejected such a sciencedriven, universally negotiated and enforced system of targets
and timetables. In its place, the Accord allows each country or
group of countries to make a separate and potentially unrelated
pledge regarding its efforts to reduce climate change. Nothing
in this process of pledges suggests that the GHG reductions in
aggregate will be tied to a scientifically based analysis of what is
necessary to avoid significant climate impacts. Indeed, as noted
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above, even if every country fulfills its pledges under the Copenhagen Accord, reductions will still fall short of what is necessary
to avoid significant climate disruption. Also lost in the Copenhagen Accord’s “pledge-and-review” approach is that the individual country’s pledges are not openly negotiated among the
parties. As a result, little possibility exists to increase commitments through the give-and-take of negotiations or by publicly
isolating a country that is doing too little. The net result is that
overall commitments are likely to be less than we could expect
through a negotiated process.

Emphasizing the National Level
Associated with the “pledge-and-review” approach of the
Accord is a shift in the emphasis of global climate policy from
the international to the national level. Rather than an internationally agreed set of caps, the focus is entirely on what national
governments are willing to pledge publicly to support. The attention is thus shifted to national level decision making. This makes
explicit what many observers have recognized all along—that
what happens at the international climate negotiations may be
less important to addressing global climate change than what
happens in the capitals of key countries. Indeed, although the
Accord provides for significantly less monitoring and oversight
than would be expected in a Kyoto-like system of mutually
negotiated and internationally accepted targets and timetables,
even compliance with a Kyoto-like system ultimately depends
on domestic action for compliance.
Perhaps the Accord’s more explicit focus on the national
level will provide for more resources being shifted from international negotiations to building capacity for national implementation. Given that developing countries have voluntarily
self-identified their mitigation actions, we could expect greater
commitment to implementation and failure to meet these individually-tailored actions may be more embarrassing than failure to
meet internationally negotiated targets. The result could be that
both donors and recipient governments may be more inclined to
invest in implementation of the mitigation commitments. If such
a focus on the national level can be transferred into a long-term
focus on the difficult work of building national capacity, global
efforts to address climate may benefit. But long-term capacity
building does not provide the promise of a quick headline or the
excitement of international negotiations. Funders, governments,
and civil society must resist the allure of international negotiations and shift at least some of their work to the less romantic
drudgery of long-term training, capacity building, and movement building at the national level. If nothing else, anything that
shifts resources from talking to action should be welcomed in
global climate policy.

The Emergence of a Pluralistic Approach to
Climate Governance
Both the substance of the Accord’s pledge-and-review
approach and the process by which it was negotiated arguably
undermine the importance of the United Nations, particularly the
UNFCCC Secretariat, in future climate governance. The Accord
was ultimately negotiated outside of the formal UNFCCC
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process, behind closed doors, with only a handful of countries
present. For the most critical part of the negotiations, only the
United States and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa,
India, and China) were in the room—and those five countries
had not been authorized by any others to negotiate the Accord.62
This process was heavily criticized by many other countries and left the parties wondering how the Accord fit with the
UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol. This tension manifested itself in
the debate on the floor at Copenhagen over whether and how the
parties to the UNFCCC should recognize this document labeled
the Copenhagen Accord. Ultimately, the UNFCCC parties neither adopted nor endorsed the Accord, instead simply “taking
note” of it. This meant the UNFCCC Parties as a whole recognized that the document existed, but gave it no formal status.
This decision threatened the legitimacy and importance of the
Accord and revealed the relatively weak consensus that surrounded it.
The debate over the formal status of the Accord revealed
deeper tensions over the appropriate forum for negotiating climate governance. The Accord was seen as a new path separate
from, and potentially dominant over, the UNFCCC process. It
also revealed the weakness of the UN process, in which under
the current rules of decision even a handful of oil-dependent
states, for example, can continue to disrupt overall progress. To
some observers the UN process is too unwieldy and too easily
held hostage by a small number of states to allow for effective
negotiations. On the other hand, the heavy-handed approach by
just a few states in negotiating and announcing the Accord also
arguably undermines progress toward reaching broad global
consensus for long-term cooperative action.
The potential for splitting off a new negotiating process under the Accord raises the specter of a more pluralistic
approach to climate governance, with significantly more institutions involved in climate policy. The Accord itself creates
three new institutions—the High Level Panel on Financing, the
CGCF, and the technology mechanism—without fully clarifying their relationship with existing institutions. Moreover, the
willingness to negotiate the Accord outside of the UNFCCC
processes suggests that in the future the most critical climate
negotiations may take place in meetings of the G-20, the Major
Economies Forum (“MEF”), or in bilateral or regional forums.
The increase in forums is not necessarily negative, but it does
raise additional challenges for ensuring policy coherence and
integration. These alternative forums do not have the broad participation of the UN process, potentially missing, for example,
the moral voice brought to the negotiations by the countries
hardest hit from climate change (the small island states and the
least developed countries). Excluding these countries from the
negotiations may make the negotiations more comfortable, but
climate policy will likely suffer. The alternative forums will also
likely be less transparent and accessible to the public. An elaborate system for civil society participation has developed around
the climate negotiations that has until now been largely lacking
in the G-20, MEF or similar forums.

13

The emergence from Copenhagen of a pluralistic approach
is also evident in specific areas of climate governance. For example, Copenhagen appeared to do little to further the interests of
a global carbon market, and in fact the failure to make progress
on a second reporting period under Kyoto suggests that a global
carbon market is not likely in the near future. This does not
mean that we have seen the end of carbon markets, however. On
the contrary, the carbon markets do not require a global cap-andtrade system to flourish. The carbon marketers were not visibly
upset with the outcome of Copenhagen because they know that
the most important decisions for a carbon market will be made at
the national and bilateral level. For example, the carbon market’s
future depends mostly on whether the United States establishes
a national cap on emissions and a framework for integrating its
market with the European emissions trading system. In addition,
Europe and the United States can adopt, through their respective legislation, the necessary rules for creating an offset market
with opportunities for developing country participation. Thus,
for example, the United States may adopt legislation that allows
U.S. companies to purchase offsets from pre-approved sectors
of specific developing countries (for example, forest credits
from Brazil). In this way the carbon market is established and
maintained not by a global set of standards negotiated under the
UNFCCC, but by a series of bilateral and regional agreements,
creating an interconnecting market for emissions trading and the
purchase and sale of reduction credits.
The situation is similar with respect to climate finance architecture. As noted above, the Copenhagen Accord reflected significant new commitments in financial transfers from the North
to the South, but it left open significant questions regarding the
future institutional architecture for managing these funds. Climate financial architecture is controversial. Among the recurring issues are: (1) the extent to which decision making will be
controlled by the donor countries; (2) what conditions, including
environmental and social safeguards, will be placed on financing; (3) how the financing commitments will be monitored to
ensure that funds earmarked for climate financing are “new and
additional;” and (4) the extent to which the UNFCCC will set
policy and coordinate financing.63 Complicating this further
is the multiplicity of institutions that already address climate
finance. The World Bank itself administers the Climate Investment Funds (“CIF”), the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, and
approximately a dozen other climate-related funds, not to mention the general climate and energy-related lending it does under
its normal operations.64 Added to the World Bank’s climaterelated activities are the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Clean Development Mechanism, and a variety
of national and regional climate-related funds. For obvious
reasons, ensuring coordination among these institutions and
between these organizations and the UNFCCC secretariat was
a high priority.
Unfortunately, the Copenhagen Accord, itself, did little to
enhance coordination, consolidate climate finance architecture,
or answer any of the related questions. In fact, in announcing
the new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, the parties added a
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new institution with little operational clarity. The expectation is
that decision making at the CGCF will be made by equal representation of developed and developing countries—still unknown
is whether the CGCF will be independent or operate under the
World Bank, what safeguard policies will attach to its operations, or what will be the composition of the CGCF decision
making structure.
The parties to the Accord also established the High Level
Panel for climate financing, but in so doing they apparently
missed an opportunity to provide for greater institutional coordination. The High Level Panel has a relatively limited mandate to
investigate new sources of revenue. During the Copenhagen
negotiations, a consensus had
been emerging for the need of
such a high level panel to coordinate the myriad of financing
institutions and to ensure that
the goals of the UNFCCC were
being efficiently advanced.
This greater coordinating role
was not (or at least not yet)
included in the High Level Panel’s mission.

Implications for
International Law

[B]oth the process and
outcome of Copenhagen
do not offer significant
reason to hope that the
world’s leaders can put
aside short-term political
expedience to make
the long-term, shared,
equitable steps needed to
avert substantial climate
disruption.

Much of the debate, both
before and after Copenhagen,
centered around whether the
parties would continue the pursuit of legally binding targets
and timetables. In the end, the
choice to accept a non-binding option reflected a lack of
political consensus—not over
whether there should be a binding agreement, but what the
requirements should be and to whom they should apply.  Indeed,
virtually every country has endorsed (and continues to endorse
after Copenhagen) the pursuit of a binding agreement, but of
course this did not lead to any binding decision at Copenhagen.
Moreover, the parties excised (with the insistence of China and
India) any language in the Accord that would have set a schedule for negotiating a binding agreement in the near future. In
short, Copenhagen can only be viewed as a major set-back for
anyone seeking a hard, binding agreement.
To some extent, however, the concerns over the relative
“hardness” of the climate regime may be too formalistic an
inquiry. We should not lose sight that the end goal of global
climate policy is to take action to reduce the risk of significant
climate disruption — it is not to have a binding agreement. In
that respect, it is helpful to abandon the arcane discussion of
whether the Copenhagen Accord is or is not binding (it clearly
is not), in favor of a discussion of whether the Accord nonetheless promotes commitments and actions that can be effectively
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monitored and enforced. As Jake Werksman of the World
Resources Institute notes, more important than the formality is
the functionality of binding international law.65 According to
Werksman, the salient questions in the context of the Accord
would be: (1) are norms being developed under the Accord specific and clear enough to monitor and determine compliance, (2)
is there a viable institutional framework available for monitoring
and determining compliance, and (3) are there sanctions available for non-compliance.
Looking first at the normative framework, the Accord
offers some modest steps forward. The Accord’s “pledgeand-review” system means that
both the United States and most
developing countries for the first
time have agreed to take some
specific actions for mitigating
climate change. As can be seen
from the few examples excerpted
above, many (although not all)
of the commitments made under
the Accord could, in theory, be
measured and verified. Thus, for
example, economy-wide reductions, improvements in energyintensity, or sector-specific
actions can all be monitored
effectively, assuming the country has established appropriate
baselines, developed methodologies for measuring results, and
committed the resources to monitoring over time. Developing
countries also agreed for the first
time to submit national reports,
including GHG inventories, biannually. This is an important commitment that can easily be monitored for compliance. In general,
then, the Accord does offer some standards of behavior that are
sufficiently clear and detailed to allow for holding the signatory
responsible.
On the other hand, the institutional framework for monitoring, reporting, and verifying country actions under the Accord
does have significant deficiencies. The MRV requirements were
one of the most hotly contested issues in Copenhagen and indeed
to some extent the entire negotiations pivoted on the extent to
which parties could reach consensus on the international MRV
requirements that would be applied to their various commitments. This is not surprising given that the MRV requirements
in many ways are critical to whether an agreement is or is not
functionally binding.
In the end, a variety of MRV requirements were suggested
by the Copenhagen Accord, but most of the details have been
left for future negotiations. Developed country mitigation commitments are expected to be subject to MRV requirements similar to those currently existing under the Kyoto Protocol. The
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financial commitments of developed countries are also to be
subject to MRV, but under guidelines yet to be adopted. The
most controversial issue relating to MRV—the extent to which
developing country NAMAs would be subject to international
oversight—resulted in a two-tiered outcome. For developing
countries that take steps without international support, MRV
will be conducted at the national level according to national
MRV requirements and included as part of the biannual national
reports submitted to the UNFCCC. These actions will also be
subject to “international consultation and analysis,” which was
left undefined but recognized to be considerably less than international MRV requirements would normally entail. Developing
countries that accept international financial support to implement their NAMAs will be subject to more robust international
MRV oversight requirements, according to detailed guidelines
to be negotiated in the future. Overall, the MRV requirements
in Copenhagen were disappointing to those who wanted to see
progress on a system with strong and comprehensive international oversight. India, China and the emerging economies considered the relative lack of MRV requirements to be a major
victory that preserved their national sovereignty.
Even more disappointing for those who want muscular
international oversight is the lack of any sanctions for noncompliance in the Accord. This is a difficult area generally in
international environmental law, with the primary sanction
being one of “naming and shaming” those in non-compliance.
This is the only sanction implicitly available under the Accord,
although there is no mechanism for parties to formally condemn

each other for non-compliance. By contrast, non-compliant parties to the Kyoto Protocol could face more significant mitigation
commitments in future reporting periods (assuming there are
subsequent reporting periods).66 The Protocol would also lend
itself readily to sanctioning non-compliance by reducing certain
regime benefits (for example, withdrawing eligibility for receiving funding under the regime or for participating in the offset
markets). The Accord thus far contemplates no such sanctions.

Conclusion
It may be too soon to understand the ultimate impact of the
Copenhagen Summit; it is after all only one step in a long-term
process of global cooperation to address climate change. In this
regard, agreement to even the anemic Copenhagen Accord is
arguably better than if the negotiations had failed to reach any
agreement at all. Most of the world has now, or soon will have,
associated with the Accord and announced either an economywide target (in the case of developed countries) or one or more
mitigation actions (in the case of developing countries). These
commitments, along with progress relating to financing, REDD,
and technology transfer may subsequently be viewed as critical
building blocks in an effective, comprehensive climate regime.
For now, however, both the process and outcome of Copenhagen
do not offer significant reason to hope that the world’s leaders
can put aside short-term political expedience to make the longterm, shared, equitable steps needed to avert substantial climate
disruption.
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climate change had within NASA, even prompting the removal
of a portion of its mission statement that Hansen used to begin
his talks: “to understand and protect our home planet.”
Hansen presents his journey from laboratory scientist, to
government advisor, to public advocate, while simultaneously
using science to explain the history, differing theories, and alternative future scenarios of climate change. To address climate
change effectively, knowledge is key; Hansen endeavors and
succeeds in presenting this knowledge in his book. He acknowledges the complexity of the issue, but refuses to allow that to be
an obstacle. In the later portion of the book, Hansen provides

recommendations for advocacy: namely increased renewable
energy production and energy efficiency, an end to the use of
coal, and the use of nuclear energy. For these objectives to be
realized requires widespread, active public involvement. Hansen
does not disparage politicians or public office; rather, he emphasizes the importance of citizens engaging in the political process
and making their voices heard. Storms of My Grandchildren is at
its core, a call to well-informed action. In the final pages, Hansen juxtaposes photographs of his grandchildren with his urgent
and direct message that “[y]ou will need to be a protector of
your children and grandchildren . . . [i]t is our last chance.”
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Endnotes: Standardization of REDD Monitoring Technology to Level the Playing Field continued from page 16
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